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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Juan Ramon Berber appeals from the judgment of conviction for lewd conduct. 
On appeal, he asserts that the district court erred when, over his objection, it admitted 
other bad act evidence, and even assuming the evidence was somehow marginally 
relevant, the district court abused its discretion when it refused to conduct the requisite 
balancing test prior to admitting the evidence. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
Juan Ramon Berber was charged, by amended indictment, with lewd conduct 
alleged to have been committed against then-thirteen year old N.M. by way of genital-
to-genital or manual-to-genital contact. (R., pp.106-07.) According to the State, the 
incident was believed to have occurred on December 31, 2008. (Tr., p.51, Ls.12-16.) 
The State sought to present 404(b) evidence consisting entirely of conduct that 
occurred after the incident for which Mr. Berber was charged. In describing the 404(b) 
evidence, the State explained, "there's all these other instances where she [N.M.] talks 
about, you know, it continued to happen. And so we intend to introduce those." 
(Tr., p.51, Ls.16-20.) That conduct included "genital-to-genital contact, genital-to-anal 
contact, oral-to-genital contact, and manual-to-genital contact" that occurred both in 
Idaho and California, all of which occurred after the incident for which Mr. Berber was 
being prosecuted. (Tr., p.52, L.15 - p.55, L.19.) 
Defense counsel objected to the 404(b) evidence, explaining that he didn't 
understand how it could be admissible without "a proper showing of how it's admissible 
or relevant to the actual charge." (Tr., p.214, Ls.1-21.) Ultimately, the district court 
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ruled that the 404(b) evidence could come in because of "the fact that - that there are 
other - issues other than propensity that could - that relate to this, I'm going to permit 
it." (Tr., p.225, L.24 - p.226, L.4.) In discussing the balancing test that is required 
under Rule 403, the district court explained that it need not conduct such a test in this 
case "because it's - it's the same individuals." (Tr., p.226, Ls.5-13.) 
Throughout the trial, the State made it clear that the incident for which Mr. Berber 
was being prosecuted was for the first incident of alleged conduct, which it believed 
occurred on New Year's Eve of 2008. (Tr., p.51, Ls.12-17, p.53, Ls.5-12, p.244, Ls.19-
23 ("But there is going to be one consistent thing that she's always talked about, and 
that's the defendant put his penis inside her vagina, that it hurt, that afterwards when 
she went to the bathroom, it hurt again."), Tr., p.609, Ls.9-19.) This can best be seen 
when examining the following portion of the State's rebuttal closing argument: 
[Y]ou don't have to find that it happened on a specific date. But I submit to 
you that memory of New Year's, the party she talked about, falling asleep 
on the couch, that there were other people there, that that's consistent 
with New Year's. People have people over. There is a party. People stay 
up late. People drink. 
You do have to agree on the act. And you have an option. You have 
either manual-to-genital contact[1] or genital-to-genital contact. It does not 
have to be both. You've heard that there was genital-to-genital contact. 
And I submit to you that that's the count, the portion of this that you find 
the defendant guilty of. That he put his penis inside her vagina on or 
1 The record is devoid of any testimony by N.M. that there was any manual-to-genital 
contact. (Tr., p.325, L.25 - p.327, L.11 (describing the New Year's Eve genital-to-
genital contact for which Mr. Berber was charged), p.330, Ls.2-20 (testifying that 
genital-to-genital contact continued to occur bi-weekly), p.330, L.21 - p.338, L.9 
(describing oral-to-genital contact on one occasion while driving from Idaho to 
California), p.338, L.10 - p.340, L.5 (bi-weekly genital-to-genital contact while in 
California), p.340, L.6 - p.344, L.1 (one incident of genital-to-anal contact), p.344, L.10 
- p.346, L.25 (describing another incident of oral-to-genital contact in Idaho), p.375, 
Ls.17-18 (denying any contact between Mr. Berber's penis and N.M.'s hand), p.378, 
Ls.4-6 (same), p.383, Ls.18-19 (same), p.394, Ls.14-23 (describing the two incidents of 
oral-to-genital contact).) 
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about New Year's Eve after he'd gained her trust. Moved in with her and 
had her completely away from her father. 
(Tr., p.620, L.20 - p.621, L.10 (emphasis added).) 
Following a jury trial at which other bad act testimony concerning a wide range of 
alleged sexual misconduct, including oral, anal, and vaginal sex occurring in at least two 
states over the course of nearly a year, Mr. Berber was found guilty of lewd conduct for 
the incident alleged to have occurred on December 31, 2008. (Tr., p.637, Ls.5-14.) 
Mr. Berber filed a timely Notice of Appeal. (R., p.212.) 
3 
ISSUE 
Did the district court err when it permitted the presentation of irrelevant propensity 
evidence in violation of Rule 404(b), and abuse its discretion when it admitted the other 
bad acts evidence without conducting the requisite balancing test? 
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ARGUMENT 
The District Court Erred When It Permitted The Presentation Of Irrelevant Propensity 
Evidence In Violation Of Rule 404(b), And Abused Its Discretion When It Admitted The 
Other Bad Acts Evidence Without Conducting The Requisite Balancing Test 
A. Introduction 
The State sought to present 404(b) evidence of conduct that occurred after the 
incident for which Mr. Berber was charged. In describing the evidence, the State 
explained that Mr. Berber was being prosecuted for an incident that occurred on 
December 31, 2008. (Tr., p.51, Ls.12-16.) In describing the 404(b) evidence, the State 
explained, "there's all these other instances where she [the victim] talks about, you 
know, it continued to happen. And so we intend to introduce those." (Tr., p.51, Ls.16-
20.) That conduct included "genital-to-genital contact, genital-to-anal contact, oral-to-
genital contact, and manual-to-genital contact" that occurred both in Idaho and 
California, all of which occurred after the incident for which Mr. Berber was being 
prosecuted. (Tr., p.52, L.15 - p.55, L.19.) 
Defense counsel objected to the 404(b) evidence, explaining that he didn't 
understand how it could be admitted without "a proper showing of how it's admissible or 
relevant to the actual charge." (Tr., p.214, Ls.1-21.) Ultimately, the district court ruled 
that the 404(b) evidence was admissible because of "the fact that - that there are other 
- issues other than propensity that could - that relate to this, I'm going to permit it." 
(Tr., p.225, L.24 - p.226, L.4.) In discussing the requisite balancing test of the probative 
versus prejudicial value of the evidence, the district court explained that it need not 
conduct such a test "because it's - it's the same individuals." (Tr., p.226, Ls.5-13.) 
Mr. Berber asserts that the district court erred when, over his objection, it 
concluded that other bad acts evidence was not propensity evidence and was relevant 
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under Rule 404(b ). Additionally, even assuming such evidence was somehow 
minimally relevant, the district court abused its discretion when it admitted the evidence 
after refusing to conduct the requisite balancing test. 
B. Standards Of Review 
1. 404(b) Determination 
When reviewing a district court's decision to admit other bad acts evidence under 
Idaho Rule of Evidence 404(b), appellate courts review the relevancy determination de 
nova. See State v. Rossignol, 147 Idaho 818, 824 (Ct. App. 2009). Review of the 
district court's balancing of the probative versus prejudicial value of the evidence is for 
an abuse of discretion. State v. Grist, 147 Idaho 49, 52 (2009). 
2. Abuse Of Discretion 
When a district court's discretionary decision is reviewed on appeal, the appellate 
court conducts a three part inquiry to determine whether that discretion was abused. 
First, the district court must have perceived the issue as one of discretion. Second, the 
district court must have acted within the outer boundaries of such discretion and 
consistently with any applicable legal standards. Third, the district court must have 
reached its decision in an exercise of reason. State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 600 
(1989). 
C. The District Court Erred Because The Evidence Was Irrelevant Propensity 
Evidence 
Idaho Rule of Evidence 404(b), in relevant part, provides: 
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the 
character of a person in order to show that the person acted in conformity 
therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as 
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proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, 
or absence of mistake or accident .... 
I.R.E. 404(b). 
Mr. Berber asserts that none of the exceptions in Rule 404(b) apply to render the 
other bad act evidence relevant and admissible in his case. As such, the district court 
committed legal error in determining that the other bad act evidence was relevant. 
In Grist, the Idaho Supreme Court clarified that there is no special exception to 
Rule 404(b)'s exclusion of character and propensity evidence for child sex abuse cases, 
holding instead that the same considerations apply regardless of the type of crime or 
the status of the alleged victim. Grist, 147 Idaho at 55. 
First, it is worth disposing of the exceptions that cannot possibly apply in this 
case. Identity is not at issue in this case; either Mr. Berber committed the act for which 
he was charged or he did not. Any motive Mr. Berber may have had was not at issue in 
this case. The only motive that could have been at issue would be whether the charged 
act was done for the purpose of gratifying the sexual desires of either Mr. Berber or 
N.M., and Mr. Berber's defense was that he did not commit the charged act, not that he 
committed the charged act without sexual motivation. (See Tr., p.556, L.4 - p.557, L.4.) 
That leaves opportunity, intent, preparation, knowledge, and absence of mistake or 
accident as potentially applying. For the reasons set forth below, the other bad act 
evidence was not relevant under any of these remaining exceptions. 
1. Corroboration By Common Scheme Or Plan 
In State v. Joy,_ Idaho_, 304 P.3d 276, 284 (2013), the Idaho Supreme Court 
considered the trial court's decision to admit evidence of other bad acts of sexual and 
physical violence alleged to have been committed by the defendant against his wife in a 
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trial for an incident of abuse that purportedly occurred several months later. In 
discussing the corroboration by common scheme or plan exception,2 the Court 
explained, 
[T]o be admissible under Rule 404(b), evidence of prior misconduct must 
show more than a superficial similarity to the nature and details of the 
charged conduct, but must instead show that the defendant's charged and 
uncharged conduct is linked in a way that permits the inference that the 
prior conduct was planned as part of a course of conduct leading up to the 
charged offense. 
Joy,_ Idaho at_, 304 P.3d at 285. 
In Grist, the Idaho Supreme Court explained that, when considering whether to 
admit other bad acts evidence "for purposes of 'corroboration' as demonstrating a 
'common scheme or plan,"' the trial court "must carefully scrutinize the evidence" sought 
to be presented "in order to determine whether such evidence actually serves the 
articulated purpose or whether such evidence is merely propensity evidence served up 
under a different name." Grist, 147 Idaho at 55. 
In light of the fact that the other bad act evidence in Mr. Berber's trial occurred 
after the conduct for which he is charged, it is impossible for the subsequent bad acts to 
have been part of a common scheme or plan to commit the charged act. Additionally, 
the district court did not, as required under Grist, subject any of the evidence to 
"careful[] scrutiny" to determine whether it actually served the articulated purpose as 
opposed to representing merely propensity evidence. 
2 The Idaho Supreme Court has explained that the exceptions for preparation, plan, 
knowledge, and identity "are most frequently grouped together under the rubric of 
'common scheme or plan."' Grist, 147 Idaho at 54. 
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2. Opportunity 
With respect to the opportunity exception, it is unclear how evidence concerning 
subsequent alleged assaults was relevant to show an opportunity to commit the 
charged act. Neither the State nor the district court articulated how such evidence was 
relevant to the opportunity exception. Additionally, the details of the other alleged 
assaults were either absent or markedly different from those underlying the charged 
conduct. 
Specifically, while N.M. acknowledged that genital-to-genital contact continued to 
occur bi-weekly after the first alleged incident, she did not provide specifics as to where 
or how the conduct was accomplished (i.e., whether it occurred in the same place (her 
bedroom with her brother present) or under similar circumstances (while her mother 
was at home but in another part of the house)). (Tr., p.330, Ls.2-20.) With respect to 
the genital-to-genital contact that purportedly occurred in California, N.M. testified that it 
occurred while she was alone in a shared bedroom, without any of her siblings present, 
unlike the charged conduct. (Tr., p.338, L.12 - p.339, L.8.) 
Finally, with respect to N.M.'s testimony concerning an incident of anal sex in 
California and two incidents of oral-to-genital contact, it is unclear how such incidents, 
especially in light of the fact that one of the oral-to-genital incidents purportedly occurred 
while Mr. Berber was driving a truck to California, would be relevant to show an 
opportunity to have committed the charged genital-to-genital conduct months earlier in 
the bedroom of a house in Idaho. In light of the fact that none of the other bad acts 
evidence was relevant to the issue of opportunity to commit the charged conduct, this 
could not have served as a basis for finding the evidence relevant. 
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Furthermore, even assuming the other alleged incidents of genital-to-genital 
contact in both Idaho and California were relevant for this purpose, the incident of anal 
sex in California and the testimony concerning oral-to-genital sex during which 
Mr. Berber, while driving, purportedly ejaculated into N.M.'s mouth was not relevant for 
this purpose. 
3. Absence Of Mistake Or Accident 
With respect to the absence of mistake or accident exception, it is important to 
note that Mr. Berber never presented as a defense that he committed the act underlying 
the charged conduct but did so only accidentally or that N.M. mistook his intent in 
engaging in the charged conduct. As such, it was not proper to conclude that the other 
bad act evidence was relevant to show an absence of mistake or accident. This case is 
different from the situation presented in State v. Cardell, 132 Idaho 217 (1998), in which 
the Idaho Supreme Court considered whether testimony about a masseur's improper 
touching of several of his adult clients was properly admitted to rebut the defendant's 
testimony that his touching of the genitals and breasts of a sixteen year old female client 
was either accidental (with respect to the genital contact) or done for therapeutic 
purposes (with respect to the breast contact). Cardell, 132 Idaho at 219-20. Unlike the 
situation in Cardell, Mr. Berber categorically denied any manual-to-genital or genital-to-
genital contact, and did not rely upon a claim of mistake or accident. (See Tr., p.556, 
L.4 - p.557, L.4.) 
Furthermore, even assuming that allegations of subsequent incidents of genital-
to-genital contact were somehow relevant to show an absence of mistake or accident in 
the charged conduct, there is no logic under which testimony concerning the incidents 
of anal and oral sex could be relevant for such a purpose. 
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With respect to the intent exception, it is worth noting that in State v. Roach, 109 
Idaho 973 (Ct. App. 1985), the Idaho Court of Appeals explained that the intent 
exception cannot always apply in cases, otherwise other bad act evidence would nearly 
always be relevant under the exception. Roach, 109 Idaho at 975. In Roach, the Court 
of Appeals held that other bad acts were not relevant under the intent exception 
because the defendant, charged with lewd conduct, had specifically denied committing 
the acts and made no claim that he had done so only innocently. Id. Mr. Berber's 
testimony was similar to that of the defendant in Roach: he denied committing the acts 
at all. Because intent was not an issue in Mr. Berber's case, the other bad acts 
evidence was not relevant under Rule 404(b). 
Because the other bad acts evidence was not relevant under any of the 
exceptions set forth in Rule 404(b), the district court committed legal error in admitting 
the evidence. Mr. Berber objected to the admission of the evidence, and as such, in 
order to avoid reversal, the State must establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
testimony concerning months of additional alleged abuse, including anal and oral sex, 
did not play any role in the jury's decision as to the one charged incident of genital-to-
genital contact. Because the State will be unable to meet this burden, Mr. Berber 
respectfully requests that this Court vacate his conviction, and remand this matter for a 
new trial at which irrelevant propensity evidence is not presented. 
D. The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Refused To Conduct The 
Requisite Balancing Test 
In the alternative to his argument that the other bad acts evidence was irrelevant, 
Mr. Berber maintains that, even assuming the other bad act evidence was somehow 
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marginally relevant under 404(b), the district court abused its discretion when it 
affirmatively refused to conduct the requisite balancing test under Rule 403 as to 
whether the relevance of the other bad acts evidence was substantially outweighed by 
the danger of unfair prejudice. Specifically, the district court reasoned, 
And the third prong that I've - that I'm going to make reference to, 
although I've impliedly done so, is where the probative value is 
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. And that is not 
a factor here, because it's - it's the same individuals. And I think the 
testimony is going to be something that either is given - I mean, either the 
jury will find that credible or they won't find it credible. So that's my ruling. 
(Tr., p.226, Ls.5-13 (emphasis added).) 
Idaho Rule of Evidence 403, in relevant part, provides, "Although relevant, 
evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the 
danger of unfair prejudice." I.R.E. 403. With respect to Rule 403's balancing test, the 
Idaho Supreme Court has explained, "Only after using this balancing test, may a trial 
judge use his discretion to properly admit or exclude the proffered evidence." 
Davidson v. Beco Corp., 114 Idaho 107,110 (1987). 
Nothing in the text of Rule 403 indicates an exception for conduct involving the 
same parties, and Mr. Berber is unaware of any case law that establishes such an 
exception. In fact, Idaho case law suggests otherwise. See Joy, _ Idaho at_, 304 
P.3d at 284 (2013) (setting forth 404(b) analysis, including application of Rule 403's 
balancing test, before discussing admission of prior bad act alleged to have been 
committed by defendant against the same victim); 3 see a/so State v. Coleman, 152 
Idaho 872, 878 n.1 (Ct. App. 2012) (noting that it need not consider the district court's 
Rule 403 analysis because it found the evidence to be irrelevant under 404(b)) (citation 
3 The Idaho Supreme Court never considered the district court's Rule 403 analysis 
because it found that the evidence was not relevant under any of the exceptions to Rule 
404(b). Joy,_ Idaho at_, 304 P.3d at 284-86. 
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omitted). Additionally, the Arizona Court of Appeals has held that the balancing test 
required under Arizona's similar rule must be conducted even when the other bad acts 
evidence involves the same victim. See State v. Garcia, 28 P.3d 327 (Ariz. Ct. App. 
2001). 
Because the district court did not act within the outer boundaries of its discretion 
and consistently with the applicable legal standards, it abused its discretion when it 
affirmatively refused to conduct the requisite balancing test before admitting the other 
bad acts evidence. Furthermore, even if the district court had conducted the requisite 
balancing test, it would have abused its discretion in admitting the other bad acts 
evidence in light of the minimal, if any, relevance4 that the evidence had and the 
substantial prejudice that its admission had.5 As such, assuming this Court rejects 
Mr. Berber's argument that the evidence was irrelevant propensity evidence, it should 
nevertheless vacate the conviction and remand this matter for a new trial at which such 
overwhelmingly prejudicial evidence is not admitted. 
4 Mr. Berber maintains that the evidence was irrelevant propensity evidence. He argues 
only that the evidence had minimal relevance in the alternative to the claim advanced in 
his primary argument. 
5 This claim is even stronger with respect to the evidence concerning allegations of anal 
and oral sex, as well as the allegations of conduct that purportedly occurred outside of 
Idaho. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth herein, Mr. Berber respectfully requests that this Court 
vacate the judgment of conviction, and remand this matter for a new trial at which the 
other bad acts evidence is not admitted. 
DATED this 10th day of September, 2013. 
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